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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH, by and through
its ROAD COMMISSION,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

)

vs.

\

JOHN E. PAPANIKOLAS, GUS E.
PAPANIKOLAS and NICK E.
PAPANIKOLAS, d/b/a MAGNA
INVESTMENT AND DEVELOPMENT COMP ANY, a partnership,
Defendants, Respondents,
and Cross-Appellants.

\

Case No.
10,657

Respondents' and
Cross-Appellants' Brief

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is a condemnation action brought by the State
of Utah to acquire real property owned by defendants
in the vicinity of 4500 South and 200 West Streets in
Salt Lake County, Utah for use in the construction of
a public highway facility known as 45th South from U.S.
91 to I-15.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Prior to trial and by written stipulation, the parties
agreed upon the sum of $50,000.00 as the amount of compensation to be paid defendants for the property taken
and for the severance damages to the remainder of defendants' property not taken, excluding therefrom compensation, if any, due defendants for certain items of
property claimed by them to be fixtures. Therefore, the
only issues tried in the lower court, sitting without a jury,
were: (1) Whether certain items of defendants' property
were fixtures and, if so, (2) whether defendants were
entitled to compensation therefor, either as a part of the
real property taken or as severance damage to the remainder of defendants' real property not taken.
The trial court found that all of the items of property in issue were fixtures and were a permanent part of
the real property upon which they were situated (R. 65).
Detailed Findings of Fact were made and entered by the
trial court for each fixture (R. 67-74). It further found
that defendants were entitled to compensation for all the
fixtures which were located on the real property taken,
less the salvage value of those fixtures or parts thereof
removed by defendants (R. 74-75). However, it ah:;o
found that defendants were not entitled to severance
damages for the fixtures which were located outside the
area taken, on the ground that the law does not specifically provide for compensaiton therefor, and, in any
event, any severance damage thereto was speculative
and indefinite as to the nature, extent, and amount
thereof (R. 75).
2

The trial court awarded judgment to defendants in
the sum of $103, 731.00, which included $53, 731.00 as
compensation for the fixtures located on the real property taken (R. 76-77).
The sum of $50,000.00 has been paid to defendants
and a partial satisfaction of the judgment in that amount
has been filed and entered (R. 78-79). Plaintiff filed its
notice of appeal (R. 80) and defendants cross-appealed
(R. 88-89). Payment of the remaining sum of $53,731.00
has been withheld pending the appeal.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks reversal of that portion of the judgment awarding defendants the sum of $53,731.00 damages
for the fixtures taken and seeks judgment in its favor
as a matter of law or, that failing, for a modification of
the judgment to exclude therefrom the sum of $2,542.00
awarded to defend ants for certain items of property
which plaintiff claims as a matter of law are not fixtures
and are not compensable.
Def end ants seek a reversal of that portion of the
judgment denying them compensation for the severance
damage done to the fixtures which were located outside
thP area taken by the condemnation. This damage was
established bv evidence in the sum of $8,590.00 and dPf endants seek judgment therefor in their favor.

3

STATEMENT OF FACT
Defendants owned a tract of land fronting on the
north side of the then existing 4500 South Street between
West Temple and 200 West Streets in Salt Lake County.
Upon this tract there was located a complex of buildings
constituting a prefabrication plant containing machinery,
equipment and facilities which had been specifically designed by defendants (Tr. 9, 12). The purpose of the
plant was to allow the best utilization of material and
manpower in custom designing and manufacturing all
the major components of a house (Tr. 9, 12). The plant
served its purpose enabling defendants to build over 800
economical yet structurally sound houses from the components designed and manufactured at the plant (Tr.
11-12). (For a detailed plan depicting the complex of
buildings and the location of each fixture found therein,
see Ex. D-1.)
Plaintiff filed this action to condemn in a fee a part
of defend ants' real property for the construction of a
public highway facility (Complaint and attached Ex.
A-2, R. 1-8). The complaint was served on defendants
March 22, 1963, the date of the taking (R. 16, Tr. 2). The
real property taken comprised the southern portion of
defendants' property upon which was located each of
the buildings in their entirety, except that the mill component building was severed by the ''take'' line, the
south 43 feet thereof lying within the area taken and
the north 93 feet thereof lying outside the area taken
(Ex. D-1). The entire complex of buildings housed the
items of property in dispute.
4

On March 27, 1963 an Order of Immediate Occupancy
of the property condemned was entered by the lower
court (R. 17-18). Thereafter, demolition crews razed the
buildings situated within the area taken, although prior
thereto some of the items of property in dispute, or parts
thereof, were removed therefrom by defendants pursuant
to permission from plaintiff. The remainder of the mill
component building was then enclosed on the south side
by the defendants who constructed a completely new wall
just north of the "take" line.
To avoid proof of uncontroverted facts at trial, the
parties stipulated inter alia:
1. That the amount of compensation to which
the defendants were entitled by reason of the
taking of defendants' property, including its land,
buildings and improvements and the severance
damage to the property not taken was $50,000.00
(including all interest, costs, etc.), excludin,q
therefrom any compensation that must be paid
for the taking of the certain items and for the
severance damages to eertain items which defendants allege were fixtures. (The items which
were taken are numbered 1 through 31 and
described in detail on Exhibit" A" (R. 43-54) and
the items which were damaged by the severance
are m1mbered 32 throu.g-h 41 and are similarly
described on Exhibit "D" (R. 58-59): said Exhibits were attached to defendants' answers
(R. 37-42) to plaintiff's second set of interrogatories (R. 33-36). These items are listed in summarv form on Exhibit "D-2", which was used
at trial.)
2. That the only issues to be tried to the court,
sitting without a jury, were:
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(a) Whether the items of property in
issue were fixtures (R. 62) and, if so,
(b) Whether defendants were entitled to
compensation for the items found to be fixtures described on said Exhibit "A" as part
of the real property taken and to compensation for the items found to be fixtures described on said Exhibit "D" as part of the
real property damaged by the severance
(R. 63).
3. That the value set forth for each item
on said Exhibit" A" was the fair market value as
of the date of the taking. That each of said items,
if found to be a fixture and compensable, would
enhance the value of the realty in said amounts
(R. 95, Tr. 4).
4. That if the court found the items set forth
on said Exhibit "D" to be :fixtures, to have been
damaged by the severance and said damages to be
compensable, that the compensation therefor
would be the fair market value before and after
the taking, for ea.ch such item (R. 63).
5. That as to items 34, 37, 39 and 40 which
were included on Exhibit "D," the resriectivc
amounts set forth on the Exhibit were the reasonable costs of relocating each said item (R. 96,
Tr. 5).

At trial, Exhibit "D-1," which shows the location of
each item claimed to be a. :fixture and identifies ea.ch item
with the same numbers as were used on Exhibits ''A''
and "D," referred to above, was received in eviden"c:.
Defendants then offered evidence, by testimony, item by
item, that the 41 items or groups of items described on
said Exhibits "A" and "D" were :fixtures (R. 15-6~,
6

86-92; Exs. 3-11). Where an item or a part of an item
was salvaged by defendants testimony was given to establish the salvage value thereof (Tr. 92-97).
Testimony was also presented to establish the
amount of damag·e caused defendants by the severance
to the items described on Exhibit "D" (Tr. 56-85). Excluded therefrom were items 34, 37, 39 and 40 for which
the parties had stipulated to the amount of severance
damages thereto, if any. (supra, p. 6)
The trial court made Findings of Fact that all the
items of property in dispute, both those located on the
real property taken and those located on the remainder
not taken, were physically attached and annexed to the
realty; that the manner in which all the items were so attached and annexed to the realty and the manner in which
the same were adapted to the buildings to which they were
attached was such that the items were intended to be and
did become a permanent part of the realty; that the realty
was enhanced thereby; and that none of the items, except
for the parts thereof removed by defendants, could be
remoyed without substantial damage to the realty or
·without substantial damage to the item itself (Findings of Fact 1, 2, 6 and 7; R. 71-74).
The trial court further found that 14 separate items
comprising a part or the whole of items numbered 6, 8,
9, 11, 13, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24 and 29, which
were all located on the real property taken, were removed
by defendants and had a salvage value of $2665.00 (Finding of Fact No. 4; R. 72). It found that the reasonable
value of the portion of the electrical system (Item No.
7

30) and pneumatic power system (Item No. 31) which
was located in the remainder of the mill component building not taken was $1,335.00 (Finding of Fact No. 5; R.
72-73). It then deducted the salvage value of the items
or components removed $(2,665.00) and the reasonable
value of the portion of the electrical and pneumatic system not taken ($1,335.00), i.e., $4,000.00, from the total
sum of $57,731.00 which the parties had stipulated was a
fair market value of the items located on the real property taken and awarded defendants the sum of $53, 731.00
as compensation for said items (R. 75-77).
The trial court also found that the fixtures described
on Exhibit "D" (Items 32-41) which were annexed to
and were a part of the remainder of the mill component
building not taken had not been damaged by reason of
the severance (Finding of Fact No. 9; R. 74) and concluded that no damages should be awarded to defendants
therefor (R. 75).
ARGUMENT
POINT NO. I
THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT AWARDING DEFENDANTS $53,731.00 COMPENSATION FOR THE TAKING BY PLAINTIFF OF
THE ITEMS FOUND BY THE COURT TO BE
FIXTURES SHOULD BE AFFIRMED.
Except for certain items which will be discussed under Point II of defendants' argument, plaintiff does not
contest the trial court's Findings of Fact that the items
in question were physically attached and annexed and
adapted to the realty in such a manner that they were
8

intended to be and did become a part of the realty (Findings of Fact 1, 2, 6 and 7 ; R. 67 -7 4) and its Conclusions
of Law based thereon that all of said items were fixtures
(Conclusions of Law 1 and 3; R. 8-9).
Therefore, the only issue presented here is whether
or not fixtures are compensable when taken as part of
the realty in a condemnation action. The law applicable
thereto is found in the Constitution of the State of Utah
which provides: "Private property shall not be taken or
damaged for public use without just compensation" (Art.
I, ~ 22) and in U.C.A. 1953, 78-34-10, which provides for
compensation and damages in condemnation proceedings,
in part, as follows :
''The court, jury or referee must hear such legal
evdience that may be offered by any of the parties
to the proceedings, and thereupon must ascertain
and assess:
1. The value of the property sought to be con-demned and all improvements thereon appertaining to the realty . . . .
2. If the property sought to be condemned constitutes only a part of a larger parcel, the damages which will accrue to the portion not
soug-ht to be condemned by reason of its severance from the portion sought to be condemned and the construction of the improvements in the manner proposed by the plaintiff.

* * *"
Thus, as plaintiff states on page 12 of its brief, ''The
crux of thf' matter is whether fixtures ... come within
the description of 'improvements thereon appertaining
9

to the realty'." Since the fixtures vvere "a part of the
realty," it is clear that they do and that both the statute
in quesion and the Constitution of the State of Utah expressly provide that compensation must be paid defendants for the fixtures taken. It is evident that other states
have allowed compensation for fixtures in condemnation cases. (E.g., see the cases cited by plaintiff from
twenty-two jurisdictions on pages 12-14 of its brief.)
The foregoing Utah constitutional and statutory provisions and the case law cited, make it clear that the trial
court's judgment awarding defendants compensation for
the fixtures, which were a part of the realty, should be
affirmed.
POINT NO. II
THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT AWARDING DEFENDANTS $2,542.00 FOR THE TAKING OF ITEMS NUMBERED 9, 11, 13, 17, 20,
22 AND 29 SHOULD BE AFFIRMED.
Since plaintiff does not contest the method used nor
the evidence relied upon by the trial court to calculate
the damages awarded, the only issue here is whether or
not the above numbered items were fixtures. In determining whether an article is a fixture, the courts generally consider three elements: (1) the annexation of the
article to the realty, (2) the adaptation of the article
to the purpose for which the realty is being used, and
(3) the intention of the owner of the article to make the
article a permanent part of the freehold. That these criteria apply to condemnation cases is clear. E.g., State v.
Galloot, 202 A. 2d 401, 42 N. J. 583 (1964); State v.
10

Feves, 365 P. 2d 97 (Ore. 1961); Carmichael v. U.S., 273
F. 2d 392 (5th Cir. 1960); In Re Slum Clearance, 52 N.E.
2d 195, 332 Mich. 485 (1952); City of Los Angeles v. Klinker, 25 P. 2d 826 (Cal. 1933); White v. Cincinnati, 71
N.E. 276 (Ct. App. Ind.1904); Kansas City Southern Ry.
Co. v. Anderson, 113 S.W. 1030 (Ark. 1908). Utah has
applied the same three-way test in non-condemnation
cases. (See the eight cases cited by plaintiff by plaintiff
on pages 14-15 of its brief.)
The annexation and adaptation of the items in issue
are shown by the following summary of the evidence given at trial:

Item No. 9 -

Swing Cut Saw.

This i tern was located in the cabinet mill wherein
items of cabinetry were manufactured and pre-assembled (Tr. 10). Within this mill were located many
other items found by the court to be fixtures (Items
No. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8) which, together with Item
No. 9, formed a synchronized prefabrication production unit. Item No. 9 was a part of the formica top
pattern table (Item No. 8) and was permanently
attached to the building by means of bolts into the
studding of the building. Although it could be removed it' 'had no purpose except as part of the operation to this specific job" (Tr. 28-29). This item
has not been used since its removal (R. 56).

Item No.

11 -

Compressor and Circulator.

These components were located in the paint
room which was operated in conjunction with and
11

in sequence to the cabinet shop (Tr. 10). This room
was custom-built to comply with the fire underwriter's requirements (Tr. 30). Plaintiff does not contest the trial court's finding that all the other equipment in this room were fixtures. The compressor
and the circulator were attached to the building and
the spray room could not have operated without
them (Tr. 31).

Item No. 13 - Molding Cut-Off Saw.
This item was attached to the outside of the
east wall of the molding rack and bin storage area.
It was bolted to the wall in a shelter and was located adjacent to the molding storage area to coordinate the storage and cutting of molding for delivery to the various construction projects (Tr. 32).
The manner in which this item was attached to the
realty is well illustrated by Exh. D-3. This item although removed by defendants has been stored and
has not been used (Tr. 110).

Item No. 17 Saw.

Self-Feed Variable Speed Rip

This item was bolted to a special base under the
the concrete floor and it was located in the center of
the component mill. It was custom-built to meet the
ripping requirements of the plant and in fact ripped
millions of feet of lumber for use at the plant. Evidence states that "it was an integral part of the
plant" and was one of the "very necessary items in
this mill" (Tr. 38). This item although removed by
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plaintiffs has been only temporarily mounted and
cannot now be used for manufacturing purposes
(Tr. 113).

Item No. 20 -

Drill Press.

This item was located within a group of fixtures
(Item Nos. 15, 21 and 25) which was used to manufacture the components for stairs. It was bolted to
the floor and the wall and was secured by a workbench (Tr. 44). This item has not been used since
its removal (R. 57).

Item No. 22 -

Continuous Feed Belt Sander.

This item was bolted to the floor and used to
sand all the components manufactured by the fixtures located in the southeast section of the componet mill. The evidence states that Item No. 22 and
the other fixtures "would all have to be used as a
continuous and contiguous operation. One without
the other would not serve the purpose. They would
all have to serve a continuous operation" (Tr. 47).
This item has not been used since its removal
(R. 57).

Item No.

29 -

Six-Inch Jointer.

This item was bolted to the floor and used to
trim and edge components manufactured by the fixtures located in the southeast section of the component mill. The evidence states that "it had a specific purpose in that location and was used in conjunction with other components and the mill could
13

not operate if it had not been there." (Tr. 53-54).
Since its removal it has not been used hy defendants and, in fa.ct, def0ndants do not know where it
is (Tr. 124).
All of the items described above, except No. 20,
were not only annexed in the manner described hut
were further annexed by means of connections to specially installed heavy duty rigid conduit electrical wiring
a.nd to air power and pneumatic mill service. Both the
wiring and the pneumatic service were found by the court
to be fixtures and the plaintiff does not contest this
finding.

It is clear from the above evidence that each of the
above described fixtures was (1) attached to and part of
the realty, and was (2) an integral part of a prefabrication production unit consisting of other fixtures and thus
peculiarly adapted to the purpose for which the realty
was being used. Plaintiffs do not contest the fact that
the items were devalued from their highest and best use
in the amount of $2,542.00 by their removal from the
realty.
Of the three elements -annexation, adaptation and
intention - the courts consider the intention of the
owner to make the article a permanent part of the rea1ty
the most important. The other two criteria are used
merely in an effort to ascertain said intent. In the cas0
of manufacturing plants, which is the situation now before the court, the adaption of the article in question
to the use to which the property is being put becomes the
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most indicative clement in determining the owner's intent because if the article has hecome an integral or necessary part of the plant, the owner's intent to make it a
permanent part of the realty is manifest. Chestnut v.
Ha,mmatt, 157 S. 2d 915 (Ct. App. La. 1963); Messenger
Puh. Co. v. Board of Property Assessment, 132 A. 2d 768,
183 Pa. Super. 407 (1957); First National Bank v. Reichneder, 91 A. 2d 277, 371 Pa. 463 (1952); Danville Holding
CorzJOration v. Clement, 16 S.E. 2d 345, 175 Va. 223
(1941); Citizens Ba!Ylk v. Mergarnthaler Linotype Co., 25
N.E. 2d 44, 216 Ind. 573 (1940); Southern California
Tel. Co. v. State Board, 82 P. 2d 422 (Cal. 1938); Seminole Supply Company v. Seminole Refining Company, 45
P. 2d 1084, 173 Alaska 32 (1945); State v. Bland, 188
S.W. 2d 838 (Mo. 1935). Thus, the doctrine of constructive annexation has arisen which permits an article to be
considered a fixture even though its annexation to the
realty is slight, if the article is used in conjunction ·with
other articles which are fixtures or if it has a lesser
value to the owners after it is removed from the adaptation to which it was put. Carmichael v. United States,
sitpra; Stale v. Dockery, 300 S.W. 2d 444 (Mo. 1957).
In addition to the cases cited above, the following
authorities illustrate that items 9, 11, 13, 17, 20, 22 and
29 were fixtures even though they were removed from
the premises without physical damage to them or to the
realty.
"[A] rticles affixed to a building by an o•vner
in complement to facilitate its use and occupation
in general, and articles attached to a building for
the- obvious purpose for which the building was
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erected, or to increase its value for such purpose,
and to be used permanently in connection therewith, as, for example, machinery placed in, and
attached to, a mill or other manufacturing plant,
ordinarily are a part of the rea1ty, even though
they are removable without injury to themselves
or the realty, or without injury to the basic structure to which they had been affixed, and even
though they may be removed and used elsewhere.''
36A C.J.S. Fixtures, ~ 5 (1961).
The items in issue meet every facet of this rule
and more in that they have not and cannot be used as
beneficiaHy and profiitably by the defendants at another
.location. Therefore, they have been damaged in that
they have been devalued by $2,542.00 by being removed
from the pref ahrication plant.
In State v. Gallant, 202 A. 2d 401 (N.J. 1964), a factory was condemned which contained many large looms
which were annexed to the realty ·with 3-inch screws.
The trial court held that the looms were not fixtures solely on the basis of considering the manner in which they
were annexed. The court of appeals reversed and remanded and in so doing quoted a New York case by
Judge Cardozo, Jackson v. State, 213 N. Y. 34, 106 N.E.
758 (Ct. App. 1914):
"It is intolerable that the state, after condemning a factory or warehouse, should surrender to
the owner a stock of second-hand machinery and
in so doing discharge the full measure of its dut~Y.
ReverPd from the hui1clings, such machinery commands only the price of second-hand articles, attached to a going plant, it may produce an clement of value as gre!'lt as it did when new."

As sta.ted above, plaintiff does not contest the fact
that the items in question were devalued to the price of
second-hand articles by their removal from the realty.
In United States v. Certain Property, Etc., 306 F. 2d
439 (2d Cir. 1962), it was held that machinery, industrial
and power wiring, shelving, cabinets, window frames,
duct work, gas and water piping, monorails and other
articles which were located on premises which had been
condemned, constituted fixtures. In so doing, the court
said:
"Machinery is deemed real property 'where
it is installed in such a manner that its removal
will result in material injury to it or the realty,
or where the building in which it is placed was
specially designed to house it, or where there is
other evidence that its installation was of a permanent nature.' (citing case) The New York
courts also regard as real estate those improvements which 'were used for business purposes
and would lose substantially all of * * * [their]
value after severance,' although their removal does
not damage the rest of the realty. (citing case)
Such improvements would include 'custom built
or specially designed fixtures [which] have little
or no market value 'vhen ripped out and removed.' " (Id. at 446) (emphasis added)
In White v. Cincinrnati R. & M. R. R., 71 N.E. 276
(Ct. App. Ind. 1904) the defendant, who owned a papermill which had been condemned, made a motion for a new
trial on the basis that the instructions to the jury which
stated that for articles to be fixtures they had to be annexed to the freehold and had to be injured if removed
therefrom v,rere erroneous. In granting a new trial the
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court referred to the criteria of annexation, adaptation and intent and then explained the doctrine of constructive annexation:
''One machine essential to the manufacture of
paper might be so annexed to or constitute such
part of a building that it could not be removed,
and another machine equally essential might be
easily removed, and yet 'When the two machinrs
are separated, each was without value for the uses
intended. In such cases, both of the machines
should be considered as attached to the freehold
- one by real and the other by constructive annexation. As the machinery is permanent in its
structure, and, being essential to the purpose for
which the buildings are used, is a fixture, it must
be regarded as realty, and goes with the building.' " (Id. at 279) (emphasis added)
In Banner Milling Company v. State, 148 N.E. 668,
240 N. Y. 533 (1925), a flour mill was condemned ancl
the court said the following:
"The claimant is entitled to compensation, not
merely for so much land, so much brick, lumber,
materials, and machinery considered separately;
b11t, if they have brr?n combined, adjusted, synchronized, and perfected into an efficient funrtio11in,q 1mit of property, then it must be paid for that
1111it, so combined, rHl;inste<l. synchronized, and
perfected, as it exiRtod at the moment of appropriation. In that limited sense, it is entitled to
the 'going value' - if such a term is permisRiMr
- of its physical property. In fixing t1w amonnt
of avvard we wi11 be g11ifled b.v that principa 1."
(Id. at 672) (emphasiR added)
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The evidence given establishes that each item in question
is a fixture according to the rationale of each of the foregoing well-reasoned cases.
Applying these rules of law governing fixtures to
the uncontested evidence presented regarding the items
in question, makes it clear that the trial court's judgment
that items 9, 11, 13, 17, 20, 22 and 29 were fixtures,
should be affirmed.
POINT NO. III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS JUDGMENT (1) THAT THE LAW DOES NOT SPECIFICALLY PROVIDE FOR COMPENSATION FOR SEVERANCE DAMAGES TO
FIXTURES WHICH ARE PART OF THE
REALTY AND (2) THAT THE SEVERANCE
DAMAGE DONE TO THE FIXTURES LOCATED OUTSIDE THE AREA TAKEN (ITEMS
32-41) IS INDEFINITE AND SPECULATIVE.
The trial court found that items 32-41, which were
all located outside the area taken, were annexed to and
were a permanent part of the realty (Findings of Fact
No. 6 and 7; R. 73-74) and concluded as a matter of law
that they were all fixtures (Conclusion of Law 3; R. 75).
Plaintiff does not contest this :finding or conclusion.
Therefore, the only two issues presented here with respect to this point are :
(1) Whether the law provides for compensation in
a condemnation action for severance damages to realty
and, if so,
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(2) Whether the evidence in this case supports a
judgment for severance damages in favor of defendants
and cross-appellants in the sum of $8,590.00.
With respect to the first issue, the Utah Constitution
provides that private property shall not be damaged for
public use without just compensation, and Sub-section
(2) of Section 78-34-10, U.C.A. 1953, specifically provides
that if the property sought to be condemned constitutes
only part of a larger parcel, that compensation must be
paid for the damages which accrue to the portion not
sought to be condemned by reason of its severance from
the portion condemned. (supra., p. 9) Pursuant to these
provisions, several Utah cases have recognized that a
condemnor must pay the condemnee compensation for
the severance damage done to real property which has
not actually been taken, but has been affected by the
condemnation. E.g., State v. Peterson, 12 Utah 2d 317,
366 P. 2d 76 (1961); Salt Lake County Cottonwood Sanitary Dist. v. Toone, 357 P. 2d 486, 11 Utah 2d 232 (1960).
Therefore, it is clear that the constitutional, statutory,
and case law of the State of Utah provide that plaintiff
must compensate defendants for the severance damage, if
any, done to the fixtures in question. The parties stipulated that the amount of compensation to be paid defendants for the severance to Items 32-41, if any, would be
the fair market value before and after the taking for each
item (supra, p. 6, R. 63).
With respect to the second issue the evidence presented by defendants at trial makes it clear that the items
in issue were rendered unusable by their severance from
20

the prefabrication plant, and more particularly, from the
mill component building. The defendant Nick E. Papanikolas, a partner of the defendant partnership, and the
designer and manager of the plant, testified that it is no
longer possible to operate the fixtures located in the remaining portion of the plant for the purposes for which
they were designed (Tr. 66). He testified the reason why
they cannot be so used is twofold: ( 1) There is no way to
economioally deliver raw material to the component area
of the mill where the fixtures are located (Tr. 67, 134137) and, (2) there is not enough work to keep the number of men necessary to operate the remaining portion of
the plant gainfully employed without the operation of
the part of the plant which was taken by plaintiff (Tr.
66). These conditions render the economy and efficiency
of the remaining portion of the plant so low that the fixtures in question cannot be profitably operated (Tr. 66).
As a matter of fact, the remaining portion of the plant
has not been operated since the plaintff took occupancy
of defendants' plant (Tr. 133) and the components
(trusses) manufactured by items 33, 34, 35, 36, 37 and 41
have been purchased by defendants since the condemnation more economically than they can now manufacture
them (Tr. 137). Plaintiff offered no witness or evidence of any kind to contradict or impeach Mr. Papanikolas' testimony that the fixtures in question could not be
used by defendants after the condemnation. The evidence, therefore, is clear and uncontradicted that defendants' real property has been damaged by the severance caused by the condemnation.

21

The question then becomes how said damages are to
be calculated.
Since the fixtures can no longer be used at their present location, it is incumbent upon defendants to relocate
them if possible to a location where they can be used and
thus minimize the damage to them. All parties agree
that items 34, 37, 39 and 40 can be relocated and thr
parties have stipulated that the amount of severance
damage thereto, if any, is their cost of relocation as set
forth on Exhibit "D ", which has previously been identified. However, the evidence is clear, as summarized
below, that i terns 32, 33, 35, 36, 38 and 41 cannot be relocated without destroying them. To establish the value
before the taking and the value after the taking of each
of these fixtures, the defendants relied upon the expert
testimony of their witness, T. Ronald Glassey. His edncation in England included an eleven-year apprenticeship and is equivalent to a Bachelor of Science Degree
in Civil Engineering (Tr. 68). He has taken and passed
the contract engineers' licernie test in several states (Tr.
69) and for the past twenty years has been in the business of manufacturing steel equipment and installing
it in various buildings and other structures (Tr. 67-68).
His present position as general manager of a steel contracting corporation includes the responsibility of eRtimating the cost of manufacturing and installing machinery (Tr. 68). He has supervised the installation of machinery in various mms which have cost many hundreds
of thousands of dollars and has had as many as a lrnnclred and twenty steel workers, carpenters and othrr
skilled craftsmen under his supervision at one time (Tr.
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68). In the past he has worked for defendants and he
has seen the prefabrication plant in question in operation (Tr. 64). He also participated in the design and installation of several of the fixtures to which he testified
as to value.
The following is a summary of the testimony given
by T. Ronald Glassey as to the market value of each fixture before and after the taking and by Nick E. Papanikolas as to the feasibility of relocating each of the fixtures.

Item No. 32 -

Storage Racks and Bins.

This fixture consists of two parts: an overhead
storage rack and a double storage rack which was
located on the floor. Because of their annexation to
the realty neither part can be removed without totally destroying it (Tr. 57). Both fixtures stored
various parts which were in the process of manufacture and were an integral part of the prefabrication process (Tr. 71). They were worth $900.00
before the taking and after the taking they had no
dollar value (Tr. 71-72).

Item No. 33 -

Truss Pattern Table With Stor-

age.
This fixture was bolted to the walls and to pipe
columns. It was used in conjunction with the other
fixtures in the manufacture of trusses and it was
built with precision (Tr. 58). It was moved a few
feet from its location which destroyed its precision,
and it is completely unusable now (Tr. 58). Its
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value at the date of the taking was $1,500.00 and
after the taking it had no dollar value (Tr. 72-73).
Item No. 34 -

Skill Radial Saw and Table.

This fixture was used in conjunetion with the
east and the west rafter saws in the precision sizing
and cutting of the long member of the trusses (Tr.
59). This item can be relocated and the parties have
stipulated the reasonable cost thereof is $120.00.
Item Nos. 35 arnd 36 Rafter Saws.

Mounted East and West

The framework and the saws were matched in
perfect precision in order to make the proper cuts
for the manufacture of trusses and it took the defendants weeks to properly design and set these
:fixtures (Tr. 60). The framework cannot be relocated but the saws themselves can be relocated (Tr.
61). The value of the framework and saws at the
date of the taking was $4,500.00 and the value of the
saws after the taking was $500.00 (Tr. 73-74). The
framework has no present value (Tr. 74).
Item No. 37 -

West Step-on Saw with Tables.

This item was used in conjunction ·with the other
fixtures in question in the manufacture of trusses
(Tr. 61). This fixture can he re located and t hr
parties have stipulated the reasonable cost thereof
is $120.00.
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Item No.

38 -

Door Jamb Machine.

This fixture was partially custom built and had
a multiple of uses in preparing doors for hanging.
It was an integral part of the component building as
it operated prior to the condemnation. Movement of
it would destroy its precision (Tr. 62). Its value at
the time of the taking was $525.00 and its value after
the taking was $25.00 (Tr. 75).

Item No.

39 -

Railroad Saw.

This fixture was used for the purpose of sizing
the heavy beams and joints used in the construction
of a house. It was bolted to a special base under the
concrete floor (Tr. 62-63). This :fixture can be relocated and the parties have stipulated the reasonable cost thereof is $150.00.

Item No. 40 -

Compressor.

This :fixture was used to deliver air at a constant pressure to the various fixtures in the prefabrication plant that were using air (Tr. 63). This fixture can be relocated and the parties have stipulated
that the reasonable cost of relocation is $200.00.

Item No. 41- Monorail and Hoist.
This fixture was custom built out of metal and
was fastened and bolted to the building. It was used
in conjunction with the other fixtures manufacturing
trusses by providing a means by which the manufactured trusses could be lifted out of the prefabri25

cation plant and loaded on a truck for delivery to the
construction site (Tr. 63, 75). At the time of taking
its value was $1,500.00 and after the taking its value
was $400.00 (Tr. 75-76).
Summarizing the above, the fair market value before and after the taking and the difference between
them for items 32, 33, 35, 36, 38 and 41 are:
Value
Before
the Taking
Item No. 32 ______________ $ 900.00
Item No. 33______________ 1,500.00
Item Nos. 35 & 36____ 4,500.00
Item No. 38______________ 525.00
Item No. 4L____________ 1,500.00

Value
After
the Taking
$ 0.00
0.00
500.00
25.00
400.00

Difference
$ 900.00
1,500.00
4,000.00
500.00
1,100.00
$8,000.00

and the reasonable cost to relocate items 34, 37, 39 and 40,
as stipulated, is :
Cost to
Relocate
Item No. 34 _______________________________________ _
$120.00
Item No. 37 _______________________________________ _
120.00
Item No. 39 _______________________________________ _
150.00
Item No. 40 _______________________________________ _
200.00
$590.00
The sum of these two is $8,590.00, the amount of compensation prayed for by dcf endants for the severance
damages suffered by them.
Plaintiff offered no testimony or evidence of any
kind to contradict or impeach the expert testimony given
by Mr. Glassey which established the difference in valne

26

of Items No. 32, 33, 35, 36, 38 and 41 before and after
the taking.
In summary, it is clear that the Utah constitutional,
statutory and case law provides that compensation must
be paid for severance damages to realty in a condemnation action. It is also clear that the uncontroverted and unimpeached expert testimony establishes that the fixtures
in question were damaged by their severance from the
realty condemned and that the amount of said damage is
$8,590.00. Therefore, it must be concluded that all the
evidence presented at trial, viewed in a light most favorable to the trial court's judgment denying defendants
compensation for severance damage, shows that said
judgment was unreasonable and clearly erroneous. It
should be reversed and judgment should be awarded defendants for severance damage in the sum of $8,590.00.
CONCLUSION

It is clear that fixtures are compensable when taken
as part of the realty in a condemnation action and the
trial court's judgment therefore in the sum of $53,731.00
should be affirmed. The evidence shows that items 9, 11,
13, 17, 20, 22 and 29, although removed from the realty
without physical damage to them or to the realty, were
annexed to the realty, were specially adapted to the use
to which the realty was being put, and were damaged in
value by being removed from the realty. The legal authorities cited support the trial court's judgment that
said items were fixtures and the judgment should be
affirmed. The evidence presented at trial, even when
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viewed in a light most favorable to plaintiff shows that
the trial court's judgment denying defendants compensation for severance damages, is in error and judgment
should be awarded defendants for severance damages in
the sum of $8,590.00.
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